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The role that frontal-striatal circuits play in normal
behavior remains unclear. Two of the leading hypoth-
eses suggest that these circuits are important for
action selection or reinforcement learning. To
examine these hypotheses, we carried out an exper-
iment in which monkeys had to select actions in two
different task conditions. In the first (random) condi-
tion, actionswere selected on the basis of perceptual
inference. In the second (fixed) condition, the animals
used reinforcement from previous trials to select
actions. Examination of neural activity showed that
the representation of the selected action was
stronger in lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC), and
occurred earlier in the lPFC than it did in the dorsal
striatum (dSTR). In contrast to this, the representation
of action values, in both the random and fixed condi-
tions, was stronger in the dSTR. Thus, the dSTR
contains an enriched representation of action value,
but it followed frontal cortex in action selection.
INTRODUCTION
Cortical projections to the striatum form the front end of the
cortical-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops. The anatomy of
these networks (Alexander et al., 1986; Haber et al., 2006; Mid-
dleton and Strick, 2000; Parent and Hazrati, 1995; Parthasarathy
et al., 1992) and the physiology of single neuron responses in
areas of frontal cortex (Averbeck and Lee, 2007; Funahashi
et al., 1991; Fuster, 2008; Histed et al., 2009; Miller and Cohen,
2001; Pasupathy and Miller, 2005) and the striatum (Apicella
et al., 2011; Barnes et al., 2005; Hollerman et al., 1998; Jin
et al., 2009; Lauwereyns et al., 2002a; Lauwereyns et al.,
2002b; Simmons et al., 2007) have been extensively studied.
Yet the contributions of these networks to normal behavior are
still unclear. There are numerous hypotheses, mostly specifying
the striatal transformation of cortical inputs, including dimen-
sionality reduction (Bar-Gad et al., 2003), reinforcement learning
(Dayan and Daw, 2008; Doya, 2000; Frank, 2005; Parush et al.,
2011), habit formation (Graybiel, 2008), motor learning (Doyon
et al., 2009), sequential motor control (Berns and Sejnowski,
1998; Marsden and Obeso, 1994; Matsumoto et al., 1999),
response vigor (Turner and Desmurget, 2010), action selection(Denny-Brown and Yanagisawa, 1976; Grillner et al., 2005;
Hazy et al., 2007; Houk et al., 2007; Humphries et al., 2006;
Kamali Sarvestani et al., 2011; Mink, 1996; Redgrave et al.,
1999; Rubchinsky et al., 2003), execution of well-learned, auto-
mated motor plans (Marsden, 1982), and the trade-off between
habitual and goal-directed or cognitive action planning (Daw
et al., 2005), also conceptualized as a trade-off between atten-
tion demanding cognitive and automatically executed actions
(Norman and Shallice, 1986).
The action selection hypothesis, first proposed on the basis
of monkey striatal lesion data (Denny-Brown and Yanagisawa,
1976), suggests that the cortex generates ensembles of possible
actions and the striatum selects from among these actions
(Houk et al., 2007; Humphries et al., 2006; Mink, 1996). The
action selected by the striatum, via the rest of the basal ganglia
(BG) circuitry, disinhibits the thalamo-cortical and brainstem
networks that lead to execution of the selected action and
inhibits the networks that represent competing actions. Many
experimental studies and models also suggest that the striatum
is important for reinforcement learning (RL) or learning from
feedback (Amemori et al., 2011; Daw et al., 2011; Frank et al.,
2004; Histed et al., 2009; Kamali Sarvestani et al., 2011; O’Doh-
erty et al., 2004; Pasupathy and Miller, 2005; Samejima et al.,
2005;) and some theories suggest that reinforcement learning
is the process by which the striatum learns to select appropriate
actions (Frank, 2005). This hypothesis suggests that striatal
activity tracks action values in the context of learning.
In the present study, we trained animals to carry out a sequen-
tial decision making task under two conditions (Figure 1). In both
conditions, the animals had to determine whether there were
more red or more blue pixels in a centrally presented cue and
make a saccade to the peripheral target that matched the
majority pixel color. In the first condition, the correct spatial
sequence of saccades changed every trial, so the only infor-
mation available about saccade direction was in the central
fixation cue. In the second condition, the correct sequence of
decisions remained fixed for blocks of eight correct trials. In
this case, the animal could use the information about which
spatial sequence had been correct in previous trials to improve
its performance.While animals carried out this task, we recorded
simultaneously from lateral-prefrontal cortex and the dorsal
striatum (Figure 1E). This allowed us to address three hypoth-
eses set forth above. Specifically, we examined action selection,
reinforcement learning, and the trade-off between attention-
demanding and automatic behaviors in the lateral prefrontal-
dorsal striatal circuit.Neuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 947
Figure 1. Task
(A) Time sequence of events in task. The inset shows an example frame from the random pixel color stimulus that was presented at fixation during Stim On. The
example is from a 60/40 split where 61.8% of the pixels were red.
(B) Trial structure of task conditions. S1, S2, etc. indicates sequence 1, sequence 2, etc. N refers to the number of trials to complete a block, which is always
8 correct trials, plus a variable number of error trials. T correspondingly varies as a function of the number of error trials.
(C) The eight different sequences of movements used in the two task conditions.
(D) The sequences are composed of ten possiblemovements. Each red line indicates one of themovementswith themovement number superimposed on the line.
(E) Drawing of coronal section showing approximate center of chamber in stereotaxic.
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Behavior
We found that in the random condition, the fraction of correct
decisions improved consistently with increasing color bias (Fig-
ure 2A) as the difficulty of determining the majority color of the
stimulus decreased. In the fixed condition performance was,
on average, consistently better than performance in the random
condition, at each color bias (Figure 2A). Furthermore, this
improvement developed across trials after a sequence switch.
Performance on the first trial after a switch to a new sequence948 Neuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.(Figure 2A, Fixed 1) was worse than the corresponding perfor-
mance in the random condition. This reflected the animal’s reli-
ance on their memory of which movements had been correct
in the previous trial. Their performance quickly improved across
trials, however, until reaching an asymptote at almost 90%
correct by the fourth trial (Figure 2A, Fixed 4), even when the
color bias was equivocal, at 50%. In this case there was no infor-
mation in the stimulus and the animal had to guess the correct
saccade direction, in the random condition. Examination of the
performance in just the 50% color bias condition as a function
of trials following a sequence switch showed that performance
Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A) Fraction of correct decisions as a function of color bias for random and fixed conditions. Data for the fixed condition is shown averaged across all trials of each
block (green) as well as separately for the first through fourth trials after a sequence switch (Fixed 1 – Fixed 4).
(B) Fraction of correct decisions in the 50% color bias condition as a function of trials after the sequence switched in the fixed condition.
(C) Reaction time in random and fixed conditions as a function of the color bias.
(D) Reaction time in the fixed condition split out by trials after switch.
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Actions and Action Values in lPFC-dSTRimproved until about trial 4, after which it remained consistent for
the rest of the block (Figure 2B). In the 50% condition, the animal
was forced to use information from previous trials to make
a correct decision. This shows that the animals were able to
use feedback from previous trials to improve their performance.
This was further reflected in the reaction times. In the fixed
condition, the animals would be able to use memory of which
sequence had been correct in the previous trials to preplan
and execute their decision more quickly. Reaction times were
consistently faster in the fixed condition at all color biases (Fig-
ure 2C). Furthermore, this reaction time improvement increased
following a sequence switch in each block (Figure 2D).
Neural Activity
We recorded the activity of 553 (230 in monkey 1, 323 in monkey
2) neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) and 453 (210 in
monkey 1, 243 in monkey 2) neurons, in the dorsal striatum
(dSTR) predominantly in the caudate nucleus. Neural activity
was recorded simultaneously from both areas in all sessions.
All reported effects were consistent in both animals. Therefore,
the data were pooled. We examined activity relative to five
factors; the task condition, the sequence executed in each trial,
the specific movement being executed, the color bias, and
learning related action value, which was estimated using a rein-
forcement learning algorithm (see Experimental Procedures).
Sequence and learning effects were less well defined in the
random sets, but because of the consistent task structure we
analyzed them as an internal control. We began by analyzing
activity using an omnibus ANOVA, across conditions, and thensplit the data by task condition to examine more specific
hypotheses.
Neurons were found which were related to all variables of
interest. For example, some neurons had responses which de-
pended on the specific movement being executed, but which
also depended on the task condition (Figure 3). This lPFC neuron
tended to respond strongly to the first and last movement of all
sequences in both the random and the fixed condition, as has
been seen in previous studies (Fujii and Graybiel, 2003).
However, it also had a robust response to the secondmovement
in sequence one and sequence five, but only in the fixed condi-
tion. We also found neurons related to the color bias. For
example, in the random sets (Figure 4A) this dSTR neuron had
a very strong baseline firing rate which was additionally modu-
lated with the color bias (Figure 4B), an effect which became
statistically significant just after movement onset (Figure 4C).
Sequence selection was modeled using a reinforcement
learning algorithm (see Experimental Procedures). This allowed
us to track the animal’s estimate of the value of each eye move-
ment, movement by movement and trial by trial. For example, in
the fixed condition, following a switch from a block in which
sequence seven had been correct to a block in which sequence
two was correct the animal continued trying to execute
sequence seven in the first trial and the value estimates reflected
this. The first execution of the leftward movement had a high
value (1.0) as this had been correct in the previous block (Fig-
ure 5A; switch + 0). After this point, the animal still believed
that the sequence had not switched and therefore it executed
a downward movement for the secondmovement. As the animalNeuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 949
Figure 3. Example lPFC Neuron with Movement and Task Condition-Related Neural Activity
Rasters and spike density functions are aligned to movement onset (time 0 in plots). Data for each individual sequence of movements is broken out by the
individual movements. Top of each panel is spike-density function, bottom is raster showing spikes in individual trials. The individual movements are indicated
with the lines connecting dots. First and third rows are from the random condition, second and fourth are from the fixed condition. Only correct trials are shown
for the fixed condition. Spike color indicates the color bias for the corresponding trial. Dark blue = 50%, green = 55%, red = 60%, cyan = 65% and violet = 70%.
This cell had p < 0.01 in ANOVA for at least one time bin for both movement and task condition.
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a high value (1.0). Following this incorrect movement, the animal
would have had some feedback that the upward movement was
correct and so it would be executedwith amoderate value (0.70).
The next movement to the left, from the top center, however, had
not been correct in the previous block and therefore it would
be executed with a very low value (0). After receiving feedback
that this was not correct the rightward saccade would have
a moderately high value (0.70). In subsequent trials there were
fewer errors and the values continued to increase as the animal
received more feedback about each of its actions. Average
action values tracked learning in a monotonic fashion (Figure 5B)
increasing with trials after switch. The responses of neurons
often scaled with the value of the actions, for example
decreasing with action value in this dSTR neuron (Figure 5C)
such that a movement executed under equivalent conditions in
a fixed block would lead to a different response depending
upon how well the sequence had been learned.
We assessed the effects of the five task factors on the
responses of individual neurons using a sliding-window
ANOVA aligned to movement onset for each movement of the
sequence, in each trial. We found that 75.8% of the prefrontal950 Neuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.neurons and 64.0% of the striatal neurons were significant for
at least one of the five factors, in one bin of the analysis. Subse-
quent percentages are reported as a fraction of these task
responsive neurons. Task condition (random versus fixed)
effects were present in about 30% of the single neurons in
both structures and showed an idiosyncratic effect of time (Fig-
ure 6A). Sequence effects were relatively flat across time, and
were present in about 25% of lPFC neurons and 17% of striatal
neurons (Figure 6B). Movement effects evolved dynamically,
peaking at about the time of movement at just over 70% in
lPFC neurons and just under 60% of dSTR neurons (Figure 6C).
Movement effects were also present well in advance of the
movement in about 15% of both striatal and lPFC neurons,
because movements could be preplanned in the fixed condition.
The reinforcement learning effect was present in about 16% of
striatal neurons and about 12% of lPFC neurons (Figure 6D).
These effects decreased following the movement. The effect of
the color bias began to increase about 300 ms before the move-
ment and peaked at the time of movement and was stronger in
the dSTR than in the prefrontal cortex (Figure 6E). There were
also interactions between the various task relevant variables
(data not shown). However, our specific hypotheses involved
Figure 4. Color Bias Example from dSTR
Data are aligned to movement onset (time 0 in plots).
(A) Raster and spike-density function data shown for the random trials only.
(B) Spike density functions averaged across all conditions for each color bias value for the neuron shown in (A).
(C) p value versus time for the main effect of color bias. The time is the beginning of each 200 ms bin. Therefore, the p value at200 is the bin from200 to 0 ms.
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split the data by task condition as well as by brain area and
examined coding of the task-relevant variables.
We first ran analyses with neural activity aligned to movement
onset. Consistent with the structure of the task, sequence
effects were much stronger in the fixed condition (Figure 7A).
There were no significant differences between the proportion
of neurons representing sequence in the lPFC and the dSTR in
either the fixed or random conditions. The residual sequence
effects in the random condition (5%–10%) were likely due to
the fact that in the random sets the animal would have partial
knowledge of the sequence as the sequence developed.
Correlations with RL were relatively flat in most areas, except
the dSTR in the fixed condition where the representation gradu-
ally increased from about 200 ms before movement onset,
reaching about 20% (Figure 7B). The lPFC and dSTR represen-
tations diverged significantly 75 ms before the movement. The
representation of movement was at chance levels in the random
condition until about 275ms beforemovement onset (Figure 7C),
whereas in the fixed condition it reflected the advanced knowl-
edge of the movement, being significantly above chance (p <
0.05, FDR corrected) at least 500 ms before the movement
began. In both the random and the fixed condition the represen-tation of movement was significantly stronger in prefrontal
cortex than it was in the dSTR, and the representations diverged
statistically significantly 150 ms before movement onset in the
random and fixed conditions. For the movement variable, we
also examined an interaction between region and task in the
proportion of neurons significant for movement by looking at
the difference in the difference in the proportion of neurons
significant in each area, between tasks. Specifically, we exam-
ined the contrast (plpfc,fixed(t)  pdstr,fixed(t))  (plpfc,random(t) 
pdstr,random(t)). However, we only found three bins with significant
differences; at 200, 175, and 0 ms (see orange dots in Fig-
ure 7C at y = 0.01). Significant effects of color bias also began
to increase 175 ms before movement onset, reaching peak
values just over 15% in the dSTR in the random condition (Fig-
ure 7D). In the random conditions, the lPFC and dSTR represen-
tation of color bias diverged 175ms before movement onset and
in the fixed condition they diverged, somewhat inconsistently,
about 25 ms after movement onset. There were also fewer
bins in which the color bias representation in the dSTR ex-
ceeded the representation in the lPFC, in the fixed relative to
random conditions, consistent with the fact that this variable
was less important in the fixed condition, but there was not
a significant difference in the fraction of neurons representingNeuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 951
Figure 5. Example Action Value and Corresponding Average Effect on Neural Activity in dSTR Neuron
(A) Action values extracted from the reinforcement learning algorithm for a series of movements. Example shows one trial preceding sequence switch and four
trials after the switch. Red arrows indicate incorrect movements, black arrows indicate correct movements. Trial always started at circle.
(B) Average action value as a function of trials after switch shows the accumulation of value across a block.
(C) Average response of a single example neuron 375 ms before movement onset for different action values. The response in this neuron decreased with
increasing action value.
Neuron
Actions and Action Values in lPFC-dSTRcolor bias in the fixed versus random conditions, in the dSTR
(p > 0.05, FDR corrected).
We also examined whether the neurons in our sample that
were significant for color bias had a positive or negative slope
(see Figure S1A available online). Neurons with a positive slope
would have higher firing rates for the high color bias conditions
(q = 0.70) and lower firing rates for the lower color bias conditions
(q = 0.50). During the time before saccade onset in the dSTR in
the random condition, we found that about half of the significant
neurons had a positive slope, and about half had a negative
slope. This fraction dipped slightly around the time of movement
onset, and then increased again. For comparison, we also exam-
ined the slope of the RL effect and found that about 30% of the
neurons had a positive slope in the dSTR (Figure S1B). There-
fore, most neurons in this structure decreased their firing rates
with increasing action value. We also examined whether neurons
tended to code both RL information and color bias information,
but generally very few neurons coded for both (max = 16 neurons
at 50 ms after movement onset in dSTR in the fixed condition).
All of these 16 neurons, at this time had the same slope for
both RL and color bias (c2 = 16, p < 0.001). Thus, these neurons
coded value in a consistent way.
We next examined effects of movement and color bias after
aligning to target onset, instead of movement onset. These two
variables were examined with different alignment as they
showed the strongest dynamics relative to the movement.
Results were generally consistent (Figures 7E and 7F) with the
results from alignment to movement. Interestingly, when aligned
to target onset, the representation of movements in the random
condition seemed to rise slightly earlier in lPFC than it did in
dSTR (Figure 7E). To assess this in more detail we reran the952 Neuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.same analysis using 100 ms binwidths with 10 ms shifts (Fig-
ure 8). This analysis showed that the movement representation
did increase in lPFC before it did in dSTR by about 60 ms (Fig-
ure 8A). Specifically, the first time that the representation ex-
ceeded baseline (comparison between proportion in each bin
following target onset and the average of bins preceding target
onset) in lPFC was 120 ms after target onset and the first time
that the representation exceeded baseline in dSTR was
180 ms after target onset. The two signals also diverged statisti-
cally significantly at about this time. The same analysis applied to
color bias in the random condition showed that the dSTR repre-
sentation exceeded baseline about 170 ms after target onset,
whereas the lPFC representation exceeded baseline about
270 ms after target onset.
Overall, the preceding analyses suggested that the represen-
tation of movements was stronger in lPFC, and it arose sooner in
lPFC in the random condition. In contrast to this, both the color
bias and RL effects in fixed blocks were stronger in the dSTR.
To address this directly, we used a repeated-measures general-
ized linear model (see Experimental Procedures) to examine
region (lPFC versus dSTR) by variable (in the fixed condition,
movement versus RL, and in the random condition, movement
versus color bias) interactions in the fixed and randomconditions
across time. We found that there was a significant region by
variable interaction in the fixed condition (p < 0.001) such that
there was a stronger representation of movements in the
lPFC and a stronger representation of RL in the dSTR. We also
found a significant region by variable interaction in the random
condition (p < 0.001), such that there was a stronger representa-
tion of movements in lPFC and a stronger representation of color
bias in the dSTR.
Figure 6. Results of ANOVA Taking into Account All Task Factors
Data are aligned to movement onset before analysis (time 0 in plots). Time axis is beginning point of 200 ms bin. Thus, 200 is the bin from 200 to 0 ms.
(A) Fraction of significant neurons (p < 0.01 in this and all subsequent plots) versus time for the main effect of task. All fractions are out of total number of task
relevant neurons, i.e., neurons that were significant in the ANOVA for at least one factor.
(B) Same as (A) for main effect of sequence.
(C) Main effect of movement.
(D) Main effect of RL.
(E) Main effect of color bias.
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Actions and Action Values in lPFC-dSTRIn the final analyses, we considered how sequence and color
bias information might be traded off during learning in the fixed
blocks. Both reaction time and fraction correct analysis of the
behavior in the fixed condition suggested that when the
sequence switched across blocks the animals reverted to ex-
tracting information from the fixation stimulus to determine the
correct direction of movement. After 3–4 trials the animals then
were able to use the accumulated feedback about which
sequence was correct, and execute the sequence frommemory.
When we examined the behavior we found that color bias and
sequence information were integrated, with color bias playing
a larger role in the early trials after the sequence switched
when action values were small (Figures 9A and 9B), and action
value or learning contributingmore to decisions later in the block.
Both action value and color bias were used to make decisions
throughout the block, however, evidenced by the impact of
color bias information on decisions even at the end of the block.
We used a logistic regression model to estimate the relative
impact of action value and color bias on decisions. The model
provided a good fit to the data (Figures 9A and 9B) and both
action value (p < 0.001) and color bias (p < 0.001) were significant
predictors of choice. Using the coefficients derived from the
model, the relative weight of color bias ðWColor biasÞ or its comple-
ment action value ðWAction value = 1WColor biasÞ on the decision
process could be estimated (Figures 9C and 9D).
In the next analysis, we considered the change in color bias
and sequence representation in neural responses in the fixed
condition with learning. We assessed this in the neuralresponses by sorting all data from each recording session ac-
cording to the RL estimate of the value of individual movements.
Movements have low action value early in the block and they
increase with trials in the block (Figure 5B). Thus, action value
captures how well the animals have learned the sequence. We
binned all the trials by action value and ran the ANOVA model
separately on the neural data in each bin, dropping RL from
themodel (Figures 9E and 9F). Only one time bin (0–300ms, rela-
tive to saccade onset) was analyzed. We found that the neural
representation of sequence increased (fraction of significant
units), and color bias decreased, as the action value increased
(Figures 9E and 9F). We then used estimates of the relative
behavioral weight of action value information, WAction valus,
derived from the behavioral model to predict neural sequence
information (fraction of neurons significant for sequence), and
the relative behavioral weight of color bias,WColor bias, to predict
the neural color bias representation (fraction of neurons sig-
nificant for color bias). We found that there was a significant
relationship between action value and neural sequence informa-
tion in lPFC (p = 0.001), but not between behavioral color bias
and neural color bias information in lPFC (p = 0.832). We also
found a significant relationship between behavioral color bias
weight and neural color bias information in dSTR (p = 0.010),
but not between behavioral action value weight and neural
sequence information (p = 0.086), although this was close to
significant. Finally, we compared these directly by examining
the interaction between behavioral action value information
and neural sequence information in lPFC and neural color biasNeuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 953
Figure 7. ANOVA Split by Task for lPFC and
dSTR
Analyses in (A)–(D) are carried out on data aligned
to movement onset (time 0 in plots). Analyses in
panels (E) and (F) are carried out on data aligned to
target onset (time 0 in plots). Orange circles indi-
cate significant differences, after FDR correction,
between the fraction of neurons significant in lPFC
versus dSTR in fixed condition. Orange x’s are the
same for the random condition. R-lPFC (random
condition, lPFC); R-dSTR (random condition,
dSTR); F-lPFC (fixed condition; lPFC); F-dSTR
(fixed condition, dSTR). See also Figure S1.
(A) Effect of sequence.
(B) Effect of RL.
(C) Effect of movement. Orange dots at y = 0.1 in
only this panel represent significant interaction
between task and region.
(D) Effect of color bias.
(E) Effect of movement.
(F) Effect of color bias.
Neuron
Actions and Action Values in lPFC-dSTRinformation in the dSTR and found a significant interaction
(p < 0.001). Therefore, as sequence information increased
through learning of action values, lPFC increased the represen-
tation of sequence, and as color bias information became less
relevant behaviorally, the dSTR decreased the representation
of color bias.
DISCUSSION
We recorded neural activity in lPFC and the dSTR while animals
carried out a task in which they had to saccade to a peripheral
target that matched the majority pixel color in a central fixation
cue. In the random condition, this was the only information avail-
able about saccade direction. In the fixed condition, the spatial954 Neuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.sequence of saccades remained fixed
for sets of 8 correct trials and, therefore,
animals could use this information to
improve their decisions. Consistent with
this, in the fixed condition the animals
made more correct decisions and re-
sponded faster. We found neurons in
both structures related to task condition,
sequence, movement, reinforcement
learning (RL), and color bias factors.When activity was split by task and compared between lPFC
and dSTR we found that there were no significant differences
in the representation of sequence information across structures.
Movements were represented well in advance in both structures
in the fixed condition, consistent with the fact that the animals
could preplan movements in this condition. In the random
condition, the movement representation in lPFC preceded
the movement representation in dSTR and in both random and
fixed conditions more neurons in lPFC represented movements
than in dSTR. In contrast to this, for both RL and color bias
factors, there was a stronger representation in the dSTR. Thus,
lPFC appeared to select actions, whereas dSTR appeared to
represent the value of the action. Finally, we found that there
was an inverse relationship in the fixed condition, betweenFigure 8. Action Selection and Color Bias
in the Random Condition
Fraction of significant neurons as a function of time
in lPFC and dSTR in the random condition. Anal-
ysis based on data aligned to target onset, not
movement onset. Orange arrow and tr are time that
fraction of significant neurons exceeds baseline
(200 to 0 ms) levels.
(A) Significance of movement factor in the random
condition.
(B) Significance of color bias in the random
condition.
Figure 9. Integration of Sequence and
Color Bias Information and Evolution with
Learning in Behavioral and Neural Data
(A) Behavior and model estimates of behavior as
a function of learning and color bias (50, 55, 60,
65). Solid lines are behavior, dotted lines aremodel
estimates.
(B) Same as (A), plotted as a function of action
value.
(C) Color bias weight derived from behavioral
model.
(D) Same as (C) plotted in terms of action value.
(E) Fraction of neurons significant for sequence
and color bias in lPFC at movement onset (bin
from t = 0 to 300 ms), normalized by number of
neurons significant when analysis is run without
binning by RL. Solid lines are data, dashed
lines are the relative behavioral weight of action
value, WAction valusðCB; valueÞ, or color bias,
WColor biasðCB; valueÞ. Note these lines are not the
same as those plotted in (D) because the x axes
differ. (D) is linear in action value, whereas (E) and
(F) are averages of rank action value.
(F) Same as (E) for dSTR.
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Actions and Action Values in lPFC-dSTRsequence and color bias representation in the dSTR, as each
block evolved. This suggests that the dSTR is involved in trading
off the relative importance of information in the fixation stimulus,
necessary when a new sequence is being selected, and learned
action value, about which sequence is correct in the current
block.
Despite the list of disorders attributable to the frontal-striatal
system—for example schizophrenia, impulsive disorders, drug
addiction, Parkinson’s disease, Tourette’s syndrome—it is still
not clear what these circuits contribute to normal behavior.
Much of the thinking about this system is driven by the anatomy
of the circuit. The frontal-striatal interaction is the front end
of a larger cortical-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical circuit
(Alexander et al., 1986; Middleton and Strick, 2000; Parent and
Hazrati, 1995). One of the prominent mechanistic theories of
this circuit suggests that the medium spiny GABAergic projec-
tion neurons in the striatum, which constitute its only output,
are divided into direct and indirect pathways (Albin et al., 1989;
DeLong, 1990; Surmeier et al., 2007). The direct channel has
predominantly dopamine D1 receptors and projects to the GPi
and the indirect channel has predominantly dopamine D2
receptors and projects first to the GPe, which projects to the
STN and then to the GPi (Surmeier et al., 1996).
Several authors have suggested that the striatum carries out
action selection (Denny-Brown and Yanagisawa, 1976; Frank,
2005; Humphries et al., 2006; Mink, 1996). These ideas have
often been motivated by the finding that STN projections to the
GPi tend to be diffuse, whereas striatal projections to the GPiNeuron 74, 947–tend to be focused and targeted (Parent
and Hazrati, 1993). Thus, the inhibitory
GPi output is increased in a diffuse way
by STN input and is decreased in a tar-
geted way by the direct striatal input.
These models suggest that mechanismswithin the striatum refine or select actions and it is the focused
projection of the striatum via the direct pathway into the GPi
that disinhibits the selected action. Despite the fact that Mink
proposed that the BG are important for action selection, it was
also noted that the responses of GPi neurons often did not
sufficiently precede movement to actually be involved in
movement initiation (Mink, 1996). This, fact complicates the
interpretation of the BG as an action selection circuit and
leaves open the question of what the activity in this pathway is
actually contributing to an ongoing movement.
As noted above, we found that more lPFC neurons than dSTR
neurons in both the random and fixed conditions coded the
movement. Furthermore, in the random condition movement
specific activity in lPFC exceeded baseline levels about 60 ms
before dSTR activity. This is generally consistent with previous
studies (Crutcher and Alexander, 1990; Sul et al., 2011), although
it has not been shown directly within a single experiment. If
lPFC activity simply increased in a nonspecific way, prior to the
movement, an ANOVA for movement on spike counts would
not show a significant effect. Therefore, our data suggest that
the action is being selected or represented in lPFC before it is
being selected in the dSTR. In general, this is inconsistent with
the action selection hypothesis.
A second prominent hypothesis suggests that the striatum is
important for reinforcement learning (Amemori et al., 2011;
Antzoulatos and Miller, 2011; Brasted and Wise, 2004; Daw
et al., 2005; Doya, 2000; Histed et al., 2009; Pasupathy and
Miller, 2005; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Williams and Eskandar,960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 955
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tant for developing habits (Graybiel, 2008; Matsumoto et al.,
1999). For example, studies have shown that the representation
of direction in the caudate preceded in time the representation
in PFC early in learning and perhaps served as a teaching signal
for the PFC (Antzoulatos and Miller, 2011; Pasupathy and Miller,
2005). This is generally consistent with our finding that the
caudate had an enriched representation of value derived from
the reinforcement learning algorithm in the fixed condition. The
learning in Pasupathy and Miller, however, evolved over about
60 trials, whereas the selection in our task evolved over 3–4 trials,
making it difficult for us to examine changes in the relative timing
of movement signals with learning, to compare our results
directly.
Much of the work that suggests a role for the striatum in RL
has been motivated by the strong projection of the midbrain
dopamine neurons to the striatum (Haber et al., 2000) and the
finding that dopamine neurons signal reward prediction errors
(Schultz, 2006). Evidence also suggests, however, that dopa-
mine neurons can be driven by aversive events (Joshua et al.,
2008; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009; Seamans and Robbins,
2010), and therefore a straightforward interpretation of dopa-
mine responses as a reward prediction error is not possible. It
is still possible that striatal neurons represent action value.
Although this has been shown previously (Samejima et al.,
2005), similar value representations have been seen in the cortex
(Barraclough et al., 2004; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; Leon and
Shadlen, 1999; Platt and Glimcher, 1999), and therefore the
specific role of the striatal action value signal was unclear. As
we recorded from both lPFC and the dSTR simultaneously, we
were able to show that there was an enrichment of value repre-
sentations in the dSTR relative to the lPFC in the same task.
Interestingly, this was true in both the random and fixed task
conditions. In the fixed task condition we found that activity
scaled with a value estimate from a reinforcement learning algo-
rithm, and in the random and fixed conditions the activity scaled
with the color bias, which is related to the animals’ probability of
advancing in the sequence and ultimately the number of steps
necessary to get the reward. This finding is consistent with
a role for the dSTR in reinforcement learning, although it
suggests a more general role in value representation, as the
neurons represent value in both random and fixed conditions.
The representation in the random condition is consistent with
finding from previous studies (Ding and Gold, 2010).
One interesting question is where the action value information
comes from, if not from lPFC. There are three likely candidates.
One is the dopamine neurons, which have a strong projection to
the striatum (Haber et al., 2000) and respond to rewards and
reward prediction errors (Joshua et al., 2008; Matsumoto and
Hikosaka, 2009; Schultz, 2002). One caveat to this idea,
however, is that dopamine works through metabotropic ion
channels (Gazi and Strange, 2002), and the dynamics of the
second messenger cascades activated by dopamine receptors
are apparently not fast enough to affect neural activity on rapid
time scales (Lavin et al., 2005). The effects could, however, be
driven by glutamate co-released from dopamine neurons (Lavin
et al., 2005). A second possibility is that the value signal is carried
by the substantial input from the centromedian/parafascicular956 Neuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.(CM-PF) thalamic nuclei (Nakano et al., 1990). A majority of
neurons in CM-PF respond when low-value actions are required
(Matsumoto et al., 2001; Minamimoto et al., 2005). An additional
possibility is that the increased value representation is coming
from other areas of frontal cortex, for example dorsal anterior
cingulate projections to the striatum. This area has a strong val-
ue representation (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009), and it sends
projections into the striatum that slightly overlap with the lPFC
projection (Haber et al., 2006). The projections from this area,
however, do not appear to project directly to the portion of the
dorsal striatum from which we recorded (Haber et al., 2006).
Overall, then, the mostly likely candidates for a fast value-related
signal in the striatumwould be glutamate coreleased from dopa-
mine neurons, or the CM-PF input.
Examination of the neural representation of color bias and
sequence in the fixed condition showed that they followed com-
plementary patterns, such that sequence information increased
in lPFC and color bias information decreased in dSTR as the
monkeys learned within each block. The increase and decrease
were significantly related to the relative behavioral weight of
sequence and color information, estimated by a Bayesian
behavioral model. Thus, when the sequence switched, the
animals reverted to using the pixel information as they relearned
the sequence, and this could be seen in both the behavioral and
neural data. As they learned the sequence they transitioned to
using less pixel information, which was less accurate, and
more sequence information, which was more accurate. This
tradeoff is consistent, at a high level, with a model which has
suggested that dual control systems, one in lPFC and one in
the dSTR, compete for control of behavior (Daw et al., 2005).
This model suggests that the tradeoff between these systems
is mediated by optimal integration based on the uncertainty
associated with the predictions of each system. In other words,
if one system is producing uncertain estimates, it is weighted
less in the decision process. Thus, our data is consistent with
this aspect of the model. What is less clear from our data,
however, is whether the dSTR does action selection when action
values are high, and the sequences can be executed like habits.
A different task structure might make this clearer.
Other groups have suggested that the BG is important for
sequential motor control, or the execution of well-learned motor
acts (Berns and Sejnowski, 1998; Fujii and Graybiel, 2005; Mars-
den and Obeso, 1994). Our animals were highly over-trained
on the sequences, and therefore the actions in our task were
both well-learned and sequential. We did not find that the
dSTR had an enriched representation of sequences, or showed
a stronger representation of actions in the fixed condition where
sequence information was most prevalent, although it did have
representations of both. We have found in previous work that
patients with Parkinson’s disease have deficits in sequence
learning (Seo et al., 2010), although the deficits in that study
were specifically with respect to reinforcement learning of
the sequences. Thus, we do not find evidence that the dSTR
is relatively more important for the execution of overlearned
motor programs. If anything, there was a bias for lPFC to have
an enriched representation of sequences and the increase in
sequence representation was more strongly correlated with
behavioral estimates of sequence weight in lPFC than in dSTR.
Neuron
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strong sequence representations, that are predictive of the
actual sequence executed by the animal, even when the animal
makes mistakes (Averbeck et al., 2002, 2003, 2006; Averbeck
and Lee, 2007).
Several groups have recently proposed that the striatum
(Lauwereyns et al., 2002b; Nakamura and Hikosaka, 2006), BG
(Turner and Desmurget, 2010), or dopamine (Niv et al., 2007)
are important for modulating response vigor, which is the rate
and speed of responding. In many cases, actions are more
vigorous when they are directed immediately to rewards than
when they must be done without a reward, or to get to a subse-
quent state where a reward can be obtained (Shidara et al.,
1998). Thus, the fact that we find a strong value related signal
in the dSTR is consistent with this hypothesis. Also consistent
with this, responding became much faster in the fixed condition
as the animal selected the appropriate sequence of actions,
although reaction times were relatively flat in the random condi-
tion as a function of color bias. The relationship between value
and reaction time in our tasks, however, is complicated, as the
animal had to carry out various computations to extract the
value information, and the computations themselves are time
consuming. This differs from the straightforward relationship
between rewards and actions that have been used in previous
tasks (Lauwereyns et al., 2002b) emphasizing a role for the
striatum in modulating response vigor.Conclusion
In summary, we have found that lPFC has an enriched represen-
tation of actions, and that in the random condition the action
representation in lPFC precedes the representation in the
dSTR. Furthermore, the enriched representation of movements
in lPFC is complemented by an enriched representation of
action values in the dSTR. The action value representation in
the dSTR was stronger for reinforcement based value in the
fixed condition, and for color bias in both fixed and random
conditions. Finally, we also found that the dSTR and lPFC
represented the extent to which sequence information (driven
by reinforcement) versus color bias information was relevant in
the task. Thus, our data is generally not consistent with the
hypothesis that the dSTR is important for action selection, but
it is consistent with the hypotheses that the dSTR plays a role
in reinforcement learning, and more generally in representing
action value, perhaps in the service of response vigor.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
General
Twomale rhesus macaques were used in this study. Experimental procedures
for the first monkey were in accordance with the United Kingdom Animals
(Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. Experimental procedures for the second
monkey were performed in accordance with the National Institutes of Health
Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and were approved by
the Animal Care and Use Committee of the National Institute of Mental Health.
Most procedures were equivalent except the UK animal received food pellet
rewards and the US animal received juice reward, as detailed below. The
recording chamber (18 mm diameter) was placed over the lateral prefrontal
cortex (lPFC) in a sterile surgery using stereotaxic coordinates (AP 26, ML
17 relative to ear-bar zero, in both monkeys) derived from a structural MRI(Figure 1E). This placed the center of the chamber near the caudal tip of the
principal sulcus with the FEF in the rear of the chamber.
Behavioral Task
The animals carried out an oculomotor sequential decision-making task
(Figure 1A). Each trial began when the animals acquired fixation on a green
circle (Fixate). If the animal maintained fixation for 500 ms the green target
was replaced by a dynamic pixelating stimulus (diameter was 1 degree of
visual angle) with a varied proportion of red and blue pixels. At the same
time target stimuli were presented (Stim On). The fixation circle stimulus was
generated by randomly choosing the color of each pixel in the stimulus (n =
518 pixels) to be blue (or red) with a probability q, which we refer to as the
color bias (Figure 1A, inset). The color of a subset (10%) of the pixels was
updated on each video refresh (60 Hz). Whenever a pixel was updated its
color was always selected with the same probability, q. The set of pixels
that was updated was selected randomly on each refresh.
The animal’s task was to saccade to the target that matched the majority
pixel color in the fixation stimulus. It could make its decision at any time after
the target stimuli appeared. After the animal made a saccade to the peripheral
target it had to maintain fixation for 300 ms to signal its decision (first Move +
Hold). If it made a saccade to the correct target, the target then turned green
and the animal had to maintain fixation for an additional 250 ms (Fixate). After
this 250 ms of fixation the green target was again replaced by the blue and red
pixelating stimulus and two new peripheral targets were presented (StimOn). If
the animal made a saccade to the wrong target it was extinguished and the
animal was forced back to repeat the previous decision step with another
pixelating stimulus. This was repeated until the animal made the correct
choice. For each trial the animal’s task was to complete a sequence of three
correct decisions at which point the animal received either a juice reward
(0.1 ml) or a food pellet reward (TestDiet 5TUL 45 mg), and a 2,000 ms intertrial
interval began. The animal always received a reward if it reached the end of
the sequence of three correct decisions, even if it made errors on the way.
Furthermore, if the animal made a mistake it only had to repeat the previous
decision, it was not forced back to the beginning of the sequence.
The task was carried out under two different conditions which we refer to as
the fixed and random conditions. In the random condition the correct spatial
sequence of decisions varied from trial to trial (Figure 1B). In the fixed con-
dition, the correct spatial sequence of eye movements remained fixed for
blocks of eight correct trials (Figure 1B). After the animal executed eight
trials without any mistakes in the fixed condition the sequence switched
pseudorandomly to a new one. Thus, in the random condition the animal
had to rely on the information in the fixation stimulus to determine the correct
saccade direction for each choice, whereas in the fixed condition the animal
could execute the sequence from memory, except following a sequence
switch. In the random condition if the animal made amistake and had to repeat
its decision, the correct direction was randomly reselected. For example, if the
animal made a rightward saccade that was wrong and was forced back to
repeat the decision, the rightward saccade could then be correct.
Recording sessions were randomly started with either a fixed or a random
set each day and then the two conditions were interleaved. Each random
set was 64 completed trials (Figure 1B), where a trial was only counted as
completed if the animal made it to the end of the sequence and received
a reward. Fixed sets were 64 correct trials because the animal had to execute
each of the eight sequences correctly 8 times to complete a fixed set. The total
number of correct and incorrect trials in fixed sets depended upon the animal’s
performance. Neural activity was analyzed if a stable isolation was maintained
for a minimum of two random sets and two fixed sets.
Each trial was composed of three binary decisions and therefore there were
eight possible sequences (Figure 1C). The eight sequences were composed of
ten individual movements (Figure 1D). Eachmovement occurred in at least two
sequences. We also used several levels of color bias, q as defined above. On
most recording days in the fixed sets we used q e (0.50, 0.55, 0.60, 0.65) and in
random sets we used q e (0.50, 0.55, 0.60, 0.65, 0.70). The higher probability
level in the random sets was included to maintain the animal’s motivation as
this condition was more difficult. The color bias was selected randomly for
each movement and was not held constant within a trial. Choices on the
50% color bias condition were rewarded randomly. The sequences wereNeuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 957
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92 days, before chambers were implanted. The first 5–10 days of this training
were devoted to basic fixation and saccade training.
In theory, the stimulus had substantial information, and an optimal observer
would have been able to infer the correct color 98% of the time with one frame
with q = 0.55, because of the large number of pixels, each of which provided an
independent estimate of the majority color. In practice there are likely limita-
tions in the ability of the animal to extract the maximum information in the
stimulus.
Data Analysis
Neural data was analyzed by fitting ANOVA models (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for details). After running the ANOVAs we had
time courses of the fraction of significant neurons (all at p < 0.01) for each
area, for each task factor. Significant differences, bin-by-bin between these
time-courses were assessed with a Gaussian approximation (Zar, 1999). We
also carried out bootstrap analysis on a subset of the data and obtained
results that were highly consistent with the Gaussian approximation. The
raw p values from this analysis suffer from multiple comparisons problems
as we applied the analysis across many time points. Therefore, we subse-
quently corrected for multiple comparisons using the false discovery rate
(FDR) correction (Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2001). To do this, we first calcu-
lated the uncorrected p values using the Gaussian approximation. The
p values were then sorted in ascending order. The rank ordered p values
(P(k)) were considered significant when they were below the threshold defined
by PðkÞ%ðk=mÞa, where k is the rank of the sorted p-values, a is the FDR
significance level and m is the total number of tests (time points) under
consideration. An a level of 0.05 was used for these tests. Any p values
exceeding this threshold were set to 1.
We modeled learning after sequence switches using a reinforcement
learning model (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Specifically, the value, vi of each
action, i, was updated according to
viðtÞ= viðt  1Þ+pf ðrðtÞ  viðt  1ÞÞ: (Equation 1)
Rewards, r(t), for correct actions were 1 and for incorrect actions were 0.
This was the case for each movement, not just the movement that led to the
juice reward. The variable rf is the learning rate parameter. We used separate
values of rf for positive (rf = positive) and negative (rf = negative) feedback, i.e.,
correct and incorrect actions. In fixed blocks, the value of the chosen action
and the value of the action which was not chosen were both updated, as the
animal knew that the opposite action was correct if the chosen action was
incorrect, and vice versa. This is often called fictive learning (Hayden et al.,
2009). When sequences switched, actions in the sequence following the
switch that were the same as actions in the sequence that preceded the switch
were given the value they had before the sequence switched. In other words
the values were copied into the new block. This was consistent with the fact
that the animal did not know when the sequence switched and so it could
not update its action values until it received feedback that the previous action
was no longer correct. Actions from the previously correct sequence that
were not possible in the new sequence were given a value of 0.
The learning rate parameters rf and an additional inverse temperature
parameter, b, were estimated separately for each session by minimizing the
log-likelihood of the animals’ decisions using fminsearch in Matlab, as we
have done previously (Djamshidian et al., 2011). If b is small, then the animal
is less likely to pick the higher value target whereas if b is large the animal is
more likely to pick the higher value target, for a fixed difference in target values.
To estimate the log-likelihood we first calculated choice probabilities using:
diðtÞ= e
bvi ðtÞ
P2
j =1
ebvj ðtÞ
: (Equation 2)
The sum is over the two actions possible at each point in the sequence. We
then calculated the log likelihood (ll) of the animal’s decision sequence as
ll = 
XT
t =1
logðdiðtÞciðtÞ+ ð1 diðtÞÞð1 ciðtÞÞÞ: (Equation 3)958 Neuron 74, 947–960, June 7, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.The sum is over all decisions in a recording session, T. The variable ci(t)
models the chosen action and has a value of one for action 1 and 0 for action
2. Average optimal values for b were 1.858 ± 0.03 and 1.910 ± 0.025 for
monkeys 1 (n = 34 sessions) and 2 (n = 61 sessions), respectively. Average
optimal values for rf = positive were 0.440 ± 0.015 and 0.359 ± 0.008 formonkeys
1 and 2. Average optimal values for rf = negative were 1.042 ± 0.03 and 0.656 ±
0.013 for monkeys 1 and 2. The value of the action that was taken, vi(t), was
then correlated with neural activity in the ANOVA model.
Integration of Action Value and Color Bias Information
in Fixed Blocks
Wemodeled the integration of sequence or learned action value and color bias
information on choices in the fixed condition. We used action value as an esti-
mate of sequence learning, because knowing the sequence entails knowing
the actions. Although it is possible that some actions are known before the
complete sequence, the structure of the task is such that knowing actions
and sequences are highly correlated. Further, we found that the behavioral
weight estimated by action value significantly predicted sequence representa-
tion in lPFC neurons (Figure 9).
We estimated the relative influence of action value and color bias informa-
tion by using logistic regression to predict the behavioral performance (fraction
correct or fc) as a function of color bias (CB) and action value. Specifically, we
fit the following equation:
fcðCB; valueÞ=gða0 + a1CB+ a2valueÞ; (Equation 4)
where g is the logistic transform. We then used the coefficients derived from
the logistic regression model to estimate the weight given to action value
and color bias:
WAction valusðCB; valueÞ = a2value
a2value+ a1CB
: (Equation 5)
For pixel color bias the weights were, WColor biasðCB; valueÞ= 1
WAction valusðCB; valueÞ. As these weights for action value and color bias are
related by a linear transform, either (but not both as they are perfectly corre-
lated) can be used to predict the fraction of neurons significant for each
factor (Figures 9E and 9F). It is clear, however, in Figure 9 that the increasing
function, WAction valusðCB; valueÞ, correlates with sequence in lPFC, and the
decreasing function, WColor biasðCB; valueÞ, correlates with color bias in the
dSTR. Values plotted in Figure 9 are averaged across color bias levels and
shown only as a function of action value. Analysis of the effect of color bias
was done across levels, and therefore we need to know the average weight
given to color bias, not the weight given to a specific color bias, which, could
not be known to the animal until after the stimulus was shown.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes one figure and Supplemental Experimental
Procedures and can be found with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.neuron.
2012.03.037.
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